

Message Text

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PAGE 01 USUN N 02766 01 OF 04 010110Z
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AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 02766

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: CONTACT GROUP MEETING OF JUNE 30

REF: A) USUN 2748, B) USUN 2747, C) MILLER-NILES
TELECON JUNE 30

1. THE GERMANS INFORMED THE CONTACT GROUP JUNE 30
THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD MET WITH ZAMBIAN
PRESIDENT KAUNDA IN LUSAKA THAT SAME MORNING AND
HAD SUGGESTED CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL
BY SWAPO AS DISCUSSED REF A. A BRIEF EXCERPT OF A
ROUGH TRANSLATION OF SCHMIDT'S TALKING POINTS FOLLOWS:
(FULL TEXT OF HIS TALKING POINTS DATAFAXED TO THE
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DEPARTMENT: ATT. NILES - IO/UNP.)

"... MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDER-
TAKE A LAST EFFORT, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER FOUR, IN
ORDER TO MEET THE AFRICAN CONCERNS ALSO IN THIS
RESPECT. OUR AIM WOULD BE TO MAKE SOUTH AFRICA
ULTIMATELY RENOUNCE ITS CLAIM TO OSHIVELLO AND TO

ENSURE UN SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF GROOTFONTEIN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO EXCLUDE ANY POSSIBLE THREAT OR INTIMIDATION FROM THAT BASE....BUT GIVEN THE NEGATIVE RESPONSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO OUR LAST DEMARCHE, WE SEE NO CHANCE OF ANY SOUTH AFRICAN FLEXIBILITY IN THIS IMPORTANT POINT AS LONG AS SWAPO HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. ONLY IF WE CAN PROVE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT THE CONFINEMENT OF THEIR TROOPS EXCLUSIVELY TO GROOTFONTEIN IS DEFINETELY THE SOLE REMAINING CONDITION FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL BY SWAPO, WILL THERE BE ANY HOPE OF A HELPFUL REACTION BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS."

2. SCHMIDT ALSO READ TO KAUNDA THE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON WALVIS BAY CONTAINED REF B. FORTUNATELY ALL FIVE GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOW APPROVED THAT DRAFT RESOLUTION. (U.S. APPROVAL CONTAINED REF C.) KAUNDA NATURALLY REQUESTED A COPY OF IT, AND SCHMIDT PROMISED TO SEE THAT KAUNDA RECEIVED ONE. THE GERMANS REPORTED THAT KAUNDA DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THE POSITIONS PRESENTED BY SCHMIDT ON EITHER ISSUE. KAUNDA ASKED THAT THE FIVE INFORM THE OTHER FRONTLINE STATES OF OUR POSITIONS BUT "REMAINED RESERVED AS FAR AS HIS PERSONAL INTERVENTION WITH SWAPO WAS CONCERNED".
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MARK CHONA LATER TOLD GERMAN AMBASSADOR MUELLER THAT KAUNDA VIEWED THE POSITIONS ON BOTH ISSUES FAVORABLY.

3. WE SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED FROM THE GERMANS THAT SCHMIDT HAD PROCEEDED ON TO LAGOS FROM LUSAKA AND HAD MADE THE SAME DEMARCHE TO OBASANJO. OBASANJO'S RESPONSE WAS "SUBSTANTILLY MORE AFFIRMATIVE THAN THAT OF KAUNDA. OBASANJO ASSURED SCHMIDT THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE POSITIONS EXPLAINED BY SCHMIDT (ON BOTH ISSUES) IN TALKING WITH KAUNDA AND NYERERE."

4. IN LIGHT OF SCHMIDT'S CONVERSATIONS THE CONTACT GROUP AGREED THAT NYERERE COULD NOT BE GIVEN A SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT PRESENTATION FROM THE ONE MADE TO KAUNDA. (THE BRITISH FELT ABLE TO CONCUR IN THIS DECISION SINCE THEIR INSTRUCTIONS HAD ALREADY APPROVED GIVING THE AMBASSADORS IN DAR DISCRETION TO RAISE THE CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE WITH NYERERE.) THE GROUP THEREFORE AGREED TO REPLACE PARAGRAPHS EIGHT AND NINE IN THE DRAFT TALKING POINTS (REF A) WITH THREE NEW PARAGRAPHS. (THE REVISED TALKING POINTS

ARE CONTAINED PARA 6 BELOW.) THE GROUP ALSO AGREED
TO A NUMBER OF OTHER CHANGES IN THE FIRST SEVEN
PARAGRAPHS OF THE TALKING POINTS. WITH TWO
EXCEPTIONS, THESE OTHER CHANGES WERE RELATIVELY MINOR.
ONE EXCEPTION WAS A SLIGHT ELABORATION OF PARAGRAPH
ONE ON WALVIS BAY. THE OTHER EXCEPTION INVOLVES THE
SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH SEVEN OF THE DRAFT
TALKING POINTS (REF A) WHICH READ: "ANY
SIGNIFICANT BREACH OF THE TERMS OF THIS PROPOSAL BY

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EXDIS

SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE REGARDED BY OUR GOVERNMENTS
AS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER REQUIRING PROMPT ACTION BY
THE UNITED NATIONS, AND OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE
PREPARED TO BACK MEASURES SHOULD THIS HAPPEN." BOTH
PARIS AND LONDON REJECTED THE REFERENCE TO STERN
MEASURES AND INSISTED THAT THE SENTENCE SHOULD END
AFTER THE WORDS "UNITED NATIONS". CANADA AND GERMANY
JOINED US IN ARGUING THAT THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE
RETAINED AS DRAFTED. OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD WERE,
HOWEVER, TO NO AVAIL. EVENTUALLY THE CANADIANS
PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING COMPROMISE: DELETE EVERYTHING

FROM "REQUIRING PROMPT ACTION" ON AND REPLACE IT WITH
"AND WE WOULD SUPPORT PROMPT ACTION BY THE UNITED
NATIONS". AFTER A LENGTHY DISCUSSION, THE BRITISH
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CAME AROUND TO ACCEPTING THIS
COMPROMISE AND THE FRENCH, LEFT ALONE, AGREED
RELUCTANTLY TO REFER IT BACK TO PARIS. THE GROUP
UNDERSTANDS THAT AN APPOINTMENT
HAS BEEN MADE FOR THE FIVE IN DAR TO SEE NYERERE
IN THE MORNING OF JULY 1, AND THE GROUP THEREFORE
AGREED THAT IF THERE IS ANY FURTHER DIFFICULTY WITH
THIS OR ANY OTHER PORTION OF THE TALKING POINTS,
THE DIFFICULTY SHOULD, IN THE INTEREST OF TIME, BE
RESOLVED BY THE FIVE IN DAR.

5. FOLLOWING ARE THE REVISED TALKING POINTS FOR USE
WITH NYERERE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THESE TALKING POINTS
SHOULD BE PRESENTED ORALLY ONLY. IT WAS ALSO AGREED
THAT, IN LIGHT OF SCHMIDT'S APPROACH TO KAUNDA, AN
APPROACH TO KAUNDA SHOULD NOT BE MADE BY THE FIVE AT
LEAST UNTIL AFTER WE RECEIVE NYERERE'S RESPONSE.
(CANADIANS HAVE ASKED THAT EMBASSY DAR INFORM
THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN DAR THAT OTTAWA
HAD APPROVED THE REVISED TALKING POINTS BELOW.
IN ADDITION, OTTAWA APPROVED THE ORIGINAL TALKING
POINTS (REF A) INCLUDING THE REFERENCE
TO STERN MEASURES.)

BEGIN TALKING POINTS.

1. AS WE PREVIOUSLY AGREED, OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN
NEW YORK MET WITH AMBASSADOR SALIM TO DISCUSS THE
TEXT OF A POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON
WALVIS BAY. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS TEXT, WHICH WE
WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU TODAY, REPRESENTS A MAJOR
STEP BY THE CONTACT GROUP TO SATISFY FRONT-LINE
AND SWAPO CONCERNS AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT
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TO JUSTIFY SWAPO'S ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSALS.
IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SWAPO AND THE FRONT-LINE
STATES AT THIS POINT EXPECT THE FIVE TO COMMIT
THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT THE INCLUSION OF WALVIS
BAY AS PART OF INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA AND TO
PUT THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF

NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT THIS END. AS YOU KNOW, THE FIVE ARE PREPARED TO DO SO AND THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION MAKE CLEAR THE STRENGTH OF OUR COMMITMENT.

2. THUS, WE ARE LEFT WITH ONE ISSUE; THE LOCATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RESIDUAL FORCE. FOLLOWING THE FRONT-LINE SUMMIT IN LUANDA, WE ADVISED SOUTH AFRICA OF THE FRONT-LINE SUMMIT'S POSITION THAT THEIR RESIDUAL TROOP PRESENCE SHOULD BE LOCATED AT A POINT SOUTH OF WINDHOEK. AS WE TOLD YOU ON JUNE 16, THE SOUTH AFRICANS REJECTED THIS POSITION, CLAIMING THAT THEY HAD MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN AGREEING TO OUR PROPOSAL AND COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO MAKE ANY MORE.

3. WE INDICATED THAT WE HOPED TO FIND WAYS AROUND THIS AND FOLLOWING OUR MEETING WITH YOU ON JUNE 16, WE RAISED THIS ISSUE ONCE MORE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. WE PUT TO THEM THE SUGGESTION THAT THEY SHOULD CONCENTRATE THEIR FORCE AT GROOTFONTEIN AND RELINQUISH THE RIGHT TO STATION FORCES IN OSHIVELLO AS WELL. THEY REITERATED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ANY CHANGE IN ITS TERMS. OUR SUGGESTION WAS REGARDED BY THEM AS A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSAL. THEY COMMENTED THAT ONCE

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EXDIS

AGAIN THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO MAKE A FURTHER CONCESSION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAD ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL,
WHEREAS SWAPO HAD GIVEN NO PUBLIC INDICATION OF ANY
DISPOSITION TO DO SO.

4. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS PROVIDES
A FAIR BASIS FOR A SPEEDY TRANSITION TO NAMIBIAN
INDEPENDENCE. SOUTH AFRICA'S RESIDUAL 1500-MAN
FORCE IN NAMIBIA, MONITORED AND CONTROLLED BY
UNITED NATIONS FORCES, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO POSE A
THREAT TO SWAPO OR TO NEIGHBORING AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

5. IN ORDER TO REASSURE SWAPO AND THE NEIGHBORING
AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THE FIVE HAVE RAISED THIS SUBJECT
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WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE SUGGESTED THAT, IN THE
CONTEXT OF HIS PLANNING FOR THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE
IN NAMIBIA, HE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NEED TO SATISFY
THE HEIGHTENED CONCERNS OF SWAPO AND THE NEIGHBORING
AFRICAN STATES, REGARDING THE RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN
TROOP PRESENCE IN THE WAKE OF THE CASSINGA RAID,
BY INCREASING THE SIZE OF THE UN TROOP PRESENCE. WE
HAVE ASSURED THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE WOULD
SUPPORT HIS FINDINGS AS TO THE LEVEL OF UNITED NATIONS
TROOPS REQUIRED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

6. IN ADDITION, WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE LOGICAL SITE
FOR THE UN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN NAMIBIA WOULD BE
AT GROOTFORTEIN. THE PRESENCE OF THE UN MILITARY
HEADQUARTERS THERE WOULD PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL
CONTROL OVER THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES LOCATED THERE.

7. AS WE HAVE NOTED IN THE PAST, WE CONSIDER THE FAIR
AND COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR PROPOSAL IS
ESSENTIAL IN ENSURING A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO
INDEPENDENCE BY NAMIBIA. ANY SIGNIFICANT BREACH OF
THE TERMS OF THIS PROPOSAL BY SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE
REGARDED BY OUR GOVERNMENTS AS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER,
AND WE WOULD SUPPORT PROMPT ACTION BY THE UNITED
NATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD STRESS THAT,
FOLLOWING THE ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL, WE WOULD
EXPECT EQUALLY SCRUPULOUS OBSERVANCE OF ITS TERMS

BY SWAPO.

8. WE ARE AT A CRITICAL POINT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS
ON NAMIBIA. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN SWAPO'S
ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSAL, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO
BELEIVE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL PROCEED
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WITH AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WEHICH WILL FOLLOW THE
WESTERN PROPOSAL IN MANY IMPORTANT RESPECTS. UNDER
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC
OPINION IN OUR COUNTRIES WILL TEND TO REGARD
SOUTH AFRICA AS HAVING MADE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH AN
INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON NAMIBIAN
INDEPENDENCE AND WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY ACTIONS
BY OUR GOVERNMENTS AIMED AT PRESSURING SOUTH
AFRICA TO ABANDON ITS COURSE OF ACTION.

9. WE ARE AWARE THAT SWAPO MAY STILL FIND IT
DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL AS IT NOW STANDS.
IF THAT SHOULD PROVE TO BE THE CASE, OUR
GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A FINAL ATTEMPT
TO PERSUADE SOUTH AFRICA TO FOREGO THE OPTION OF
STATIONING FORCES IN OSHIVELLO. HOWEVER,
GIVEN THE RESPONSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO OUR LAST
DEMARCHE, WE SEE NO CHANCE OF ANY SOUTH AFRICAN
FLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINT AS LONG AS SWAPO HAS
NOT ACCEPTED THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. ONLY IF WE
CAN PROVE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT THE CONFINEMENT
OF THEIR TROOPS EXCLUSIVELY TO
GROOTFONTEIN IS DEFINETELY THE SOLE REMAINING CONDITION
FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL BY
SWAPO, WILL THERE BE ANY HOPE OF A HELPFUL REACTION
BY THE SOUTH AFRICAS. IN ORDER TO PURSUE THAT COURSE
OF ACTION, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE FIVE FIRST
TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE BY SWAPO OF OUR PROPOSAL WITH
THAT ONE INTERPRETATIVE ADJUSTMENT. JUDGING FROM
OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE PAST, WE BELIEVE THIS CAN BE
ACHIEVED ONLY IF THE FRONT-LINE LEADERS CAN PREVAIL
ON SWAPO TO DO SO.

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10. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE HOPE
THAT YOU WOULD AGREE, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, TO
ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE SWAPO TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL
IN ITS PRESENT FORM AS THE BEST MEANS OF OBTAINING
AN IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT. IF HOWEVER
YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES CANNOT PERSUADE SWAPO
ALONG THESE LINES, WE WOULD ASK THAT YOU THEN ATTEMPT
TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALTERNATIVE AND
LESS CERTAIN COURSE OF ACTION WE HAVE JUST DESCRIBED.
END TALKING POINTS.
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